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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 
JAMAL GREENE

 
INTRODUCTION 
In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court rejected a death-row inmate’s 
claim that a state’s use of a lethal injection protocol that carried risks of se-
vere pain from improper administration violated the Constitution.1  Justice 
Thomas wrote a remarkable concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, in 
which he argued that the plurality opinion announcing the governing stand-
ard for claims of this sort was wrong, and should have hewed more closely 
to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment.2  Justice Thomas 
wrote that “the Framers intended to prohibit torturous modes of punishment 
akin to those that formed the historical backdrop of the Eighth Amend-
ment,” referring to eighteenth-century practices such as burning a person 
alive, public dissection, and live disembowelment.3 
Yet the Thomas concurrence merits our attention less for what it says 
than for what it does not say. Nowhere in the opinion does Justice Thomas 
refer to the Fourteenth Amendment.  This is so even though the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the constitutional provision under review in the case.4  For 
Justice Thomas, as for many academic originalists, the Eighth Amendment 
applies to states only to the extent that relief from cruel and unusual pun-
ishments constituted a privilege or immunity of citizenship at the time the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.5  Failing to mention or to offer any 
explicit analysis of the governing constitutional text is not unusual in Su-
 
Copyright © 2012 by Jamal Greene. 
 Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  I would like to thank participants at 
the Conference on Constitutional Faith/Constitutional Redemption, held at the University of Texas 
School of Law, and the Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress Con-
ference, held at the University of San Diego School of Law.  This Essay also benefited from 
workshops held at Brooklyn Law School, Columbia Law School, and Northwestern Law School, 
and from conversations with Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Michael Stokes Paulsen, John McGinnis, 
and Ilya Somin.  Melissa Lerner provided valuable research assistance. 
 1. 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 94 (Thomas. J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence.  
 3. Id. at 94–97. 
 4. Id. at 47 (majority opinion) (noting that the Eighth Amendment was incorporated against 
the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)). 
 5. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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preme Court opinions, but it is a notable omission in an opinion in which 
the Court’s two most prominent originalists chide their colleagues for fail-
ing to heed constitutional text and history. 
The Fourteenth Amendment is the Mr. Cellophane of originalist writ-
ing.  Judges, scholars, and ordinary citizens writing or speaking in the 
originalist tradition consistently ignore the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment even when that understanding should, on originalist 
principles, control the outcome of a case.  An originalist who believes that 
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated against state governments some or 
all of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights should, in adjudicating cases 
under incorporated provisions, be concerned primarily (if not exclusively) 
with determining how the generation that ratified that amendment under-
stood the scope and substance of the rights at issue.  An originalist who be-
lieves the Constitution is “colorblind” should seek justification for that view 
not in general considerations of policy or fairness, but in the original under-
standing of the Equal Protection Clause.  An originalist seeking to calibrate 
the constitutional division of authority and responsibility between states and 
the national government should  engage with (or expressly disclaim) chang-
es to that division brought about by the Reconstruction Amendments gener-
ally and by the Fourteenth Amendment in particular.  With limited excep-
tions,6 originalists do not engage in these inquiries, tending instead to focus 
intently on the writings and utterances of the eighteenth-century constitu-
tional drafters.  Indeed, the biographies and intentions of men like John 
Bingham and Jacob Howard, drafters of the most important rights-related 
language in the Constitution, remain unknown even to constitutional law-
yers and academics, to say nothing of the average Tea Partier. 
I note this tension not to create a “Gotcha!” moment for opponents of 
originalism—there are quite enough of those—but to report a phenomenon 
in need of explanation.  It is true, of course, that many originalists are simp-
 
 6. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
215–30 (1998); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1387–88 (1992); Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
447, 447–48 (2009) [hereinafter Lash, Beyond Incorporation]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption 
of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 
1087–88 (1995) [hereinafter Lash, Establishment Clause]; Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of 
the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1106, 1109 (1994) [hereinafter Lash, Free Exercise]; see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE 
SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 357–83 (2000) (exploring Reconstruction-era con-
ceptions of free speech); Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 469, 469 
(1993) (proposing that the Establishment Clause be read through the lens of equal citizenship as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Con-
stitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1059–61 (2011) (arguing that the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies the First Amendment to a broader range of state acts than the First Amend-
ment itself applies to federal acts). 
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ly Saturday sinners, inconsistent in their devotion when it leads to outcomes 
that are not congenial to their political preferences or cultural values.  This 
is not a flattering charge, but it is not unique to originalists, nor does it nec-
essarily reflect willful hypocrisy so much as cognitive dissonance.  Incon-
sistency in application of one’s preferred constitutional interpretive meth-
odology is a function of the human condition, and its mere existence is 
barely interesting.  A consistent pattern of inconsistency does, however, 
lead one to wonder whether originalists in practice are faithful to a coherent 
set of commitments that originalism in theory simply does not recognize.  
The explanations this Essay proposes emerge in part from familiar 
places and in part from less familiar ones.  Prominent originalists, Justice 
Scalia most famously, have conceded the need for originalism to negotiate 
important nonoriginalist precedents and cultural assumptions if its propo-
nents are to remain relevant.7  Respect for stare decisis may in some cases 
rationalize the gaps in originalist analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
This may be particularly so in the case of incorporated rights.  But stare de-
cisis is only part of the story and, I will argue, a relatively small part.   
The missing, and less familiar, proposition I wish to advance is that 
originalism in practice is not just a method of interpretation, but rather—
and most persuasively—a normative claim on American identity; it is most 
compelling as an ethical rather than hermeneutic exercise.  And for several 
related reasons, originalists’ ethical compass infrequently points toward the 
Reconstruction Era or the political work of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
drafters. 
First, the Fourteenth Amendment was a failure in its time.  Akhil Amar 
has emphasized that the original Constitution “was not merely a text but a 
deed—a constituting.”8  The Fourteenth Amendment was designed, among 
other things, to “protect[] the black man in his fundamental rights as a citi-
zen with the same shield which it throws over the white man,”9 but to the 
degree its central work has been accomplished, much later generations are 
responsible.  The Amendment’s inertia underwrites at least two expressive 
features of Fourteenth Amendment originalism that make it normatively 
unattractive to most professed originalists.  For one thing, the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a significant resource in narratives of constitutional redemp-
tion, but a weak resource in narratives of constitutional restoration.  A nar-
rative of restoration urges us to adopt the values of the past because the past 
was a better time and, therefore, has a stronger normative claim on Ameri-
can identity.  But a constitutional argument taking the form of an ethical 
 
 7. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
 8. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005). 
 9. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763 (1866) (Sen. Howard). 
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claim about American identity makes productive use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment only if the claim sounds in a redemptive register—the 
Amendment announces majestic principles that we must constantly strive, 
prospectively, to realize.  Those who believe such principles to be central to 
constitutional interpretation neither need nor tend to use originalism as a 
justificatory framework.  Also, the failure of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
drafters to accomplish their ends during their lifetimes denies to them the 
heroic status enjoyed by Madison, Jefferson, Hamilton, and Washington.  
That heroic status is essential to using appeals to history as persuasive au-
thority in modern constitutional argument. 
Second, across a number of domains the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
supposes and reinforces a commitment to pluralism rather than assimilation, 
and originalists tend to find comfort in determinacy.  Redemptive constitu-
tionalism is attractive precisely because and to the degree that it refuses to 
bind modern interpretation to decisions already made, avenues already 
blocked, and minds already closed.  Originalism is attractive precisely be-
cause and to the degree that it binds interpretation to a fixed and knowable 
set of meanings, so as to impede the indeterminacy and opportunity associ-
ated with open-textured constitutional construction.  It is no wonder that 
opponents of moral relativism tend disproportionately to support original-
ism, or that African Americans tend overwhelmingly not to support it.10  
And it is no wonder that an amendment committing the Nation in the 
broadest of terms to an ambiguous set of ends is an unlikely resource in 
originalist arguments.  
Third, the Reconstruction Era is painful and embarrassing to—and 
therefore best forgotten by—many of those whose cultural and political 
commitments lead them to originalism.  The promise of Reconstruction is 
not just, in Martin Luther King, Jr.’s memorable words, a “bad check.”11  It 
is also a symbol of two-thirds of the country’s conquest over and occupa-
tion of the other third.  While the American Revolution remains a powerful 
expression of unification enabling and enabled by defeat of a common ex-
ternal enemy, the Civil War is just that, and victory in one part of the coun-
try necessarily meant defeat in the other.  This obvious difference should, in 
principle, have no effect on constitutional interpretation generally or on the 
mechanics of originalism in particular, but it is likely to diminish the role of 
the Reconstruction Era within a persuasive account of American ethos.  It is 
 
 10. A recent survey found that only 4 percent of African Americans identified as originalists.  
See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 356, 406 tbl. 9d (2011). 
 11. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memorial 
(Aug. 28, 1963), available at www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/martin-luther-kings=speech-dream-
full-text/story?id=14358231.   
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particularly likely to have this effect among Southerners or among those 
who sympathize with either the state-centered or the white-supremacist po-
litical project the Confederate states were defending. 
These rationales do not suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment some-
how falls outside originalists’ formal rules of engagement but rather that, in 
practice, it is not a part (or is only a small part) of persuasive originalist 
forms of argumentation.  That being so, the project of reforming originalism 
to reflect the full impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on constitutional 
law is likely to resonate with a very limited audience.  
I.   
This Essay’s premise—that originalists devote insufficient attention to 
the Fourteenth Amendment—will seem obvious to some, but it is sure to 
baffle others.  There is, after all, a voluminous academic literature on the 
drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the specific intentions of 
its authors and of the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and on the 
purposes behind its broad provisions.  The original understanding of the 
Equal Protection Clause regarding racial segregation was debated exten-
sively in the briefing to Brown v. Board of Education12 and has been a cen-
tral concern of constitutional historians and theorists ever since.13  Studies 
of the scope of incorporation attending intimately to the legislative debate 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment have appeared in well-known 
Court opinions14 and in canonical academic works.15  The recent case of 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, in which the Court found that the individual 
right to possess a loaded handgun at home extends to state and local in-
fringements, featured extensive briefing addressing the original understand-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters as to gun rights, and led to du-
eling opinions discussing and dissecting those historical arguments.16  
 
 12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 13. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 76 (1990); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation De-
cision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1, 4–6 (1955); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Consti-
tutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881–82 (1995); Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952–53 
(1995). 
 14. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 15. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
181–87 (1998); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155–89 (1997); CHARLES FAIRMAN & STANLEY MORRISON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY (1970). 
 16. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048–50 (2010). Id. at 3086 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); id. at 3112 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3130–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia’s dismissive remark at oral argument in McDonald that 
grounding incorporation in the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the 
“darling of the professoriate” may suggest rather too much attention to the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, not too little.17 
Some clarification of the argument, then, is in order. Originalist ne-
glect of the Fourteenth Amendment is selective rather than general.  The 
debate over whether the Amendment was intended to incorporate some or 
all of the Bill of Rights continues to be waged among originalists,18 but it is 
not accompanied by a similarly spirited debate over the degree to which any 
particular right in the Bill of Rights was understood by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers as it was understood in 1791.  To take 
our earlier example, suppose that Justice Thomas is correct that the Eighth 
Amendment was not originally understood to forbid a particular method of 
punishment solely based on an unintended risk of significant pain.  Suppose 
further that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the 
Eighth Amendment in fact erected a constitutional prohibition against such 
a method of punishment.  In a case in which the alleged infringer is a state 
or local rather than a federal actor, it is difficult to understand a top-down 
theory of interpretation under which the first view would control over the 
second.  Indeed, for an originalist who believes Barron v. Baltimore19 was 
correctly decided, it is difficult to understand why the original understand-
ing of the Bill of Rights ever should, in itself, control a constitutional case 
involving state and local action. 
And yet, interpreting incorporated rights as if they were original rights 
is very much the norm among both originalists and nonoriginalists.  Exam-
ples abound in both judicial opinions and scholarship. Take Justice Black’s 
opinion in Everson v. Board of Education20 discussing James Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance21 as informing the correct interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause.22  Or Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford v. Wash-
 
 17. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No 08-1521). 
 18. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3089 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting sources). 
 19. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not apply to state gov-
ernments). 
 20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 21. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
VOL. II 1783–1787, 183–91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).   
 22.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.  In Lynch v. Donnelly, which upheld a crèche display, Justice 
Brennan wrote in his dissenting opinion that “[t]he intent of the Framers with respect to the public 
display of nativity scenes is virtually impossible to discern primarily because the widespread cele-
bration of Christmas did not emerge in its present form until well into the 19th century.” 465 U.S. 
668, 720 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Of course, the relevant framers should be the Four-
teenth Amendment framers. 
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ington,23 which lavishes attention upon the common-law background of the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause but pays hardly any mind to the 
antebellum understanding of the right.24  Consider originalist scholar Mi-
chael McConnell’s exhaustive excavation of the eighteenth-century Fram-
ers’ understanding of the scope of constitutionally required religious ac-
commodation.25  Once one begins to look for instances of originalists over-
overlooking the influence of Reconstruction-Era thought on the meaning of 
rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, such instances appear 
ubiquitous. 
The position that only eighteenth-century views are relevant to the 
original meaning of the incorporated Bill of Rights is difficult to defend, but 
it is not impossible to articulate.  Someone could arrive at this position by 
arguing that all the Fourteenth Amendment generation did with respect to 
the Bill of Rights was to apply its first eight amendments, as originally un-
derstood, to state infringements.  This is not, however, a plausible interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor have I ever seen it articulated ex-
plicitly by any modern originalist.  There is, first, a conceptual difficulty in 
proceeding in this way.  As Barron makes clear, the ratifying generation for 
the Bill of Rights conceptualized the document through a federalism lens. 
From this vantage, one’s belief as to the scope of a right is quite unlikely to 
be indifferent to whether the right is asserted against the centralized federal 
government or against a state or local actor.  The difficulty is most clear 
with respect to those rights that may have been originally understood as 
purely or mostly structural, such as the Establishment Clause or the Second 
Amendment, but it remains problematic even for those rights that plainly 
implicate individual freedoms.  The fact that the federal government is one 
of enumerated powers might, for example, reasonably influence the sorts of 
regulatory practices that qualify as takings under the Fifth Amendment. 
Even apart from this conceptual difficulty, there remains the problem 
of whose view of the Bill of Rights’ original understanding is the one that 
controls—that of the modern judge or that of the Fourteenth Amendment 
ratifying generation.  That generation, broken and battered by a war that 
may have been precipitated in part by the Dred Scott decision, did not trust 
 
 23. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 24. Id. at 42–50. 
 25. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1413–15 (1990).  As Kurt Lash has written, the view that the 
Free Exercise Clause requires religious exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability is 
more plausibly attributed to the Reconstruction Republicans, who were familiar with slave-state 
literacy laws that prevented Bible reading, than to the eighteenth-century Framers.  Lash, Free 
Exercise, supra note 6, at 1109–10. 
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federal judges.26  Nor did those Americans have the same regard many 
modern Americans do for the constitutional Framers—William Lloyd Gar-
rison, who called the Constitution “a covenant with death and an agreement 
with hell,” was invited to raise the federal flag at Fort Sumter at the conclu-
sion of the Civil War.27  It is unthinkable that that generation believed itself 
to be delegating interpretation of the Bill of Rights, as applied to states, to 
federal judges to determine how eighteenth-century Americans would have 
understood its protections (which did not at the time apply to states).  If this 
is the view that any originalist holds, I should like to hear him advance it. 
It is necessary to qualify my skepticism somewhat because one can in 
fact imagine a kind of fainthearted originalism that leads to the result criti-
cized above. Consider Justice Scalia, who originated the “fainthearted” la-
bel to describe his own views in 1989.28  Justice Scalia has accepted certain 
aspects of the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence as settled law.29  Even 
though he criticizes substantive due process at every available opportuni-
ty,30 he is unwilling to reconsider whether incorporation—a form of sub-
stantive due process—is constitutionally legitimate or whether it might 
more faithfully be accomplished via a different doctrinal avenue.31   
There are at least three levels of generality at which we might adjudi-
cate the meaning of an incorporated right as applied to a state or local actor.  
At the highest level of generality, we might consider whether the entire cor-
pus of rights protected against federal infringement in the Bill of Rights is 
also protected in exactly the same way against state infringement.  At a me-
dium level of generality, we might consider whether some rights but not 
others are protected in exactly the same way against state as against federal 
infringement.  At a low level of generality, we might consider the degree to 
which the scope and substance of rights protection is the same in the states 
versus in the federal context. Broadly speaking, the Court has debated 
whether to proceed at a high versus medium level of generality, and has set-
 
 26. See Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356 & n. 18 (1964) (“[T]he framers and backers of the 
fourteenth amendment were primarily interested in enlarging the powers of the Congress, not 
those of the federal judiciary, which was looked upon with considerable distrust”). 
 27. See Merton L. Dillon, The Failure of the American Abolitionists, 25 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 
159, 159 (1959). 
 28. Scalia, supra note 7, at 864. 
 29. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No. 08-1521).  
 30. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558, 587–92 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing the majority’s decision to use substantive due process grounds to overrule earlier precedent). 
 31. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (2010) (“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due 
Process as an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights ‘because it is both long established and narrowly limited.’  This case does not 
require me to reconsider that view, since straightforward application of settled doctrine suffices to 
decide it.” (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
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tled on the medium level: total incorporation has lost and selective incorpo-
ration (at a markedly low threshold) has won.32  With notable and criticized 
exceptions,33 the Court has focused little on the choice between a medium 
or low level of generality; that is, the Court has not much debated the de-
gree to which incorporated rights should have precisely the same content at 
the state level versus the federal level.  For most incorporated rights, the 
Court made no distinction at the time of incorporation and has made no dis-
tinction in subsequent cases.34 
Now return to our fainthearted originalist.  He might believe that both 
the triumph of selective incorporation and the rejection of individualized 
consideration of the difference between state and federal rights are settled, 
but that the meaning of particular federal rights is not settled.  Justice Scalia 
appears to fit this description: he rejects the Court’s evolving standards ju-
risprudence in considering the meaning of the Eighth Amendment but he 
accepts that the Eighth Amendment is incorporated and that its meaning is 
identical whether applied to state or to federal action.  He refuses, on 
originalist grounds, to accept that firing (or refusing to hire) a civil servant 
or a public contractor based on political ideology violates the First Amend-
ment, but he has never, to my knowledge, suggested that the rule should be 
different as between state and federal employers.35  It may be that many 
originalists are fainthearted in just this way, and so have little reason to 
consider the original understanding of particular privileges or immunities of 
citizenship.  The McDonald majority’s extensive discussion of Reconstruc-
tion-Era views on gun rights may lend faint support to this possibility: by 
suggesting that the Second Amendment might protect a right against federal 
but not state infringements, the McDonald dissenters unsettled the other-
wise settled rejection of divided incorporation. 
There is reason to doubt, however, that this degree of faintheartedness 
is a considered choice on the part of most originalists.  First, and perhaps 
 
 32. Compare, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–49 (1968) (noting that only some 
rights protected from federal infringement by the Bill or Rights are applicable to the states), with 
id. at 163 (Black, J., concurring) (suggesting that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 33. E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366–67 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the incorporated Sixth Amendment, unlike the original, does not require jury unanimity in 
criminal cases); cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I do not 
understand . . . how [interpreting the Due Process Clause] can be short-circuited by the simple 
device of incorporating into due process, without critical examination, the whole body of law 
which surrounds a specific prohibition directed against the Federal Government. The consequence 
of such an approach . . . is inevitably disregard of all relevant differences which may exist be-
tween state and federal criminal law and its enforcement.”).  
 34. See Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005). 
 35. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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most significantly, I have never seen the just-described argument articulated 
in any writing, originalist or not. It is generally just assumed without dis-
cussion that originalism requires that the original understanding of federal 
rights determine the meaning of incorporated rights.  Second, many 
originalists, including Justice Thomas, clearly are not fainthearted in this 
way, and nonetheless make the same choices as to interpretation of incorpo-
rated rights.36  Third, unmooring the practice of originalism from an inquiry 
into the meaning of a politically significant text deprives the theory of its 
usual normative justifications.  At no point in our constitutional history did 
any democratically responsible institution determine and embody within a 
text the notion that state and local actors should be bound by Justice Scal-
ia’s considered view of the eighteenth-century meaning of the Bill of 
Rights.  If his view as to the eighteenth-century meaning of a particular 
right happens to approximate the view as to its 1868 meaning held by the 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is only through happenstance.  
And so it is not that the originalist inquiry as it is usually conducted is help-
ful but insufficient to decide cases involving incorporated rights; it is that 
the inquiry is simply the wrong one. There is little reason, in principle, for 
an originalist to privilege the meaning of an incorporated right circa 1791 
over its meaning in any other year prior to 1868.  
There are, moreover, other ways in which originalists conspicuously 
neglect the Fourteenth Amendment.  Many, for example, are famously un-
interested in the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause re-
garding race-conscious government action.  The Congress that enacted the 
Fourteenth Amendment also enacted race-conscious measures designed to 
ameliorate the condition of former slaves.37  It is reasonable to suppose that 
an originalist would not, then, take issue with contemporary affirmative ac-
tion plans aimed at inclusion rather than exclusion of racial minorities.  But 
many originalists, including Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, object to 
such plans on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause requires both 
 
 36. See Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 727, 742–43 (2009) (chiding Justice Thomas for ignoring the implications of Reconstruc-
tion for the meaning of the Establishment Clause).  As for McDonald, it remains to be seen 
whether future Courts inclined toward Second Amendment originalism will turn to the Fourteenth 
Amendment ratifiers for guidance as to the scope of the protected right and not merely the fact of 
its incorporation. 
 37. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997) (stating that the 
1860s Congress repeatedly enacted statutes granting benefits to freedmen on the basis of race); 
Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 
VA. L. REV. 753, 754–55 (1985) (describing Reconstruction-era legislative efforts to help freed-
men).  
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states and the federal government to be colorblind.38  To my knowledge, 
neither Justice has ever sought in writing to justify that reading in original-
ist terms (nor, incidentally, has either Justice justified application of the 
Equal Protection Clause to the federal government in such terms).39 
Another area of conspicuous inattention to the Fourteenth Amendment 
is federalism.  Many originalists reject Justice Miller’s view (or rather, the 
received wisdom as to his view) in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause does not incorporate the Bill of Rights against 
the states.40  The more celebrated dissenting opinions of Justice Field and 
Justice Bradley both emphasize, not unreasonably, that the Reconstruction 
Amendments were designed to effect a radical transformation in the divi-
sion of authority and responsibility between states and the federal govern-
ment.41  It does not take much examination of the legislative history behind 
the Fourteenth Amendment—and the repeated invocations therein of Justice 
Washington’s illustrative enumeration of privileges and immunities in Cor-
field v. Coryell42—to conclude that many of those responsible for the 
Amendment’s codification believed that it empowered the federal govern-
ment to guard against state infringement of a wide array of rights both en-
compassing and extending well beyond those enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights.43  Yet it remains that in both scholarship and in Court opinions, the 
 
 38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 772 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520–21 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 39. Justice Thomas has, in passing, suggested that race-conscious measures enacted during 
Reconstruction are consistent with a colorblind Constitution insofar as they were designed as rem-
edies for past “state-sponsored discrimination.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 772 n.19 (Thomas, 
J., concurring).  This is not, of course, the same as affirmatively defending the colorblind view but 
it is something of a start.  It is not clear from Justice Thomas’s brief discussion how the numerous 
Reconstruction-era statutes appropriating money to destitute “colored” persons were narrowly tai-
lored remedial measures.  See Rubenfeld, supra note 37, at 430–31 (describing such statutes).  The 
most thoughtful originalist justification for a constitutional prohibition on affirmative action is 
offered by John Harrison, who has argued that much of what passes today for equal-protection 
jurisprudence is more appropriately adjudicated under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which 
protects against racial discrimination in positive-law rights of state citizenship.  Harrison, supra 
note 6, at 1388–89.  The legality of a particular instance of affirmative action would then depend 
on the nature of the deprivation at issue.  Id. at 1463–64.  This is not a “colorblind” view as usual-
ly understood and, in any event, is a self-consciously limited treatment of affirmative action from 
an originalist perspective.  See id. at 1462–64. 
 40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872).  In my view, Justice Miller’s 
majority opinion does not support the anti-incorporation view (which would, in any event, be dic-
ta), but Justice Miller later joined Chief Justice Waite’s opinion in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. 542, 552 (1876), which unambiguously rejected incorporation.  
 41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 93 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). 
 42. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 43. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 30 
(1980) (describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a dele-
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texts most consistently used to reveal original understandings on federalism 
issues are the Federalist Papers;44 we see no effort to identify or celebrate 
the canonical federalism-related documents of the Reconstruction Era. 
Members of the Court have on occasion engaged the history of Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases in which the scope of that provi-
sion was directly at issue.  For example, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores turned to the drafting history of the Four-
teenth Amendment to aid in his conclusion that the section’s purpose was 
“remedial” rather than substantive.45  But even in cases in which Section 5 
is the very provision under review, careful attention to original understand-
ing is the exception rather than the rule.  Thus, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 
when then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court upholding the power of 
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity via Section 5, his opinion 
was deeply doctrinal in nature, referring only indirectly to the original un-
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.46  And in United States v. Mor-
rison, in disclaiming application of Section 5 to an asserted pattern of state 
judicial underenforcement of cases involving gender-motivated violence, 
Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, relied on, in part, nineteenth-century cases ex-
pounding federal judges’ views of Reconstruction power, without address-
ing the intentions or understandings of relevant members of Congress or the 
public at large.47  Indeed, he wrote that viewing Section 5 as limited was 
“necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the 
Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the Na-
tional Government.”48 
Simply to assert the need to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from 
too radically altering the federal-state balance begs the question.  An 
originalism sensitive to the whole Constitution would confront openly the 
degree to which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to affect that bal-
ance, and not just in cases directly implicating Section 5.  In cases like Fitz-
patrick and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,49 the Court treated the 
Fourteenth Amendment as an addendum rather than as an amendment.  In 
the latter case, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist debated Justice Souter at 
 
gation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect rights that are not listed either in the 
Fourteenth Amendment or elsewhere in the document”). 
 44. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 914–15 (1997) (examining The Federalist 
Papers to decide whether the federal government may require state officials to execute federal 
laws); see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 39 (James Madison), NO. 32 (Alexander Hamil-
ton). 
 45. 521 U.S. 507, 509, 520–24 (1997). 
 46. 427 U.S. 445, 446, 453–56 (1976). 
 47. 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 620. 
 49. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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great length over the extent to which the eighteenth-century Framers would 
have intended Congress to be able to abrogate state sovereign immunity via 
its Article I powers,50 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “Fitzpatrick can-
not be read to justify ‘limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh 
Amendment through appeal to antecedent provisions of the Constitu-
tion.’”51  Chief Justice Rehnquist was quoting Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., which (like Justice Scalia’s 
opinions addressing incorporated rights) treats the Constitution as a linear 
series of provisions whose interpretation sheds no light on other provisions 
not specifically mentioned.52  As Charles Black writes, “in dealing with 
questions of constitutional law, we have preferred the method of purported 
explication or exegesis of the particular textual passage considered as a di-
rective of action, as opposed to the method of inference from the structures 
and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some prin-
cipal part.”53 
It takes some creativity to assert that the Fourteenth Amendment en-
larges the scope of Congress’s Article I powers, and I do not mean to sug-
gest that an originalist would necessarily be wrong to deny the assertion.  
Consider, though, the following interpretation: Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides the basis for an expansive definition of national citi-
zenship, and Section 5 permits enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“by appropriate legislation.”54  We might interpret “appropriate legislation” 
as the City of Boerne Court did: as legislation that “enforces” judicially rec-
ognized rights.55  But we might also interpret it in less juriscentric terms, as 
legislation that enforces congressionally recognized rights.56  The work 
then done by the word “appropriate,” from the perspective of a reviewing 
court, would be to preserve other limitations on Congress’s legislative pow-
er imposed by the Bill of Rights, the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I 
 
 50. Id. at 66–71 & n.11. 
 51. Id. at 66 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part)) (emphasis added). 
 52. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 41–42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 53. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 
(1969). 
 54. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated 
Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2001) (considering the argument that, if the Four-
teenth Amendment modifies the Eleventh Amendment, then it also changes the scope of Con-
gress’s Article I powers).   
 55. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (explaining that Congress’s power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited to enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
 56. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
2022 (2003) (arguing that there are “strong independent reasons for affirming Congress’s authori-
ty to employ Section 5 power to enforce its own constitutional understandings”). 
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Section 9, and the like.57  Whether or not one accepts this theory, it is rea-
sonable to expect originalists to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment into 
extant accounts of federalism.  If one of the original impulses behind feder-
alism was to ensure that “the society itself will be broken into so many 
parts, interests and classes of citizens, that rights of individuals, or of the 
minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majori-
ty,”58 it would be useful to know whether and to what degree vastly ex-
panding congressional and judicial power to preempt state exercises of the 
police power renders these impulses less intelligible. 
It bears mention that selective neglect of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
not limited to law professors and judges, though we need not dwell long on 
the point.  I regard it as nearly axiomatic that, outside of courts and academ-
ic halls, most participants in public discourse who exalt originalism fail al-
most entirely to discuss the Fourteenth Amendment.  In his book Liberty 
and Tyranny, Mark Levin, a radio host and self-styled “constitutional ex-
pert” writes, “For much of American history, the balance between govern-
mental authority and individual liberty was understood and accepted. . . .  
But in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, the Statists successfully 
launched a counterrevolution that radically and fundamentally altered the 
nature of American society.”59  Within that ellipsis is no reference to slav-
ery, the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, or anything else that might 
plausibly have affected the balance between governmental authority and in-
dividual liberty prior to the New Deal.  Levin does discuss slavery in the 
book, but he insists that:  
The Constitution’s ratification by the southern states would ulti-
mately mark the beginning of the end of slavery—coming to frui-
tion with their defeat in the Civil War and the subsequent adop-
tion by Congress and the states of the Thirteenth (formally 
abolishing slavery), Fourteenth (prohibiting the abridgement of 
citizens’ rights), and Fifteenth (prohibiting race as a bar to voting) 
Amendments to the Constitution.60 
Levin’s narrative of continuity, in which the Fourteenth Amendment is 
cast as a seamless embodiment of foundational principles, is common 
among popular originalists.  W. Cleon Skousen’s The Five Thousand Year 
Leap, which has become a kind of sacred document among many Tea Par-
 
 57. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“[T]he McCulloch v. Maryland 
standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”).  
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 59. MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 5–6 (2009). 
 60. Id. at 58. 
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tiers,61 was written “to catalogue the ingredients of the Founding Fathers’ 
phenomenal success,” but includes a single, cursory reference to the Four-
teenth Amendment.62  Skousen’s chapter on the principle that “All Men Are 
Created Equal” asserts, without referencing slavery, that “the Founders 
were able to establish a society of freedom and opportunity.”63  When 
Skousen does make a fleeting reference to slavery, it is in a portion of the 
chapter in which he says that “the blacks” soon thereafter began to receive 
advancement opportunities “which no doubt the Founders such as Washing-
ton, Jefferson, and Franklin would have strongly approved.”64  Skousen 
does not, of course, mention that all three men were slaveholders.  
Before turning to the reasons for originalists’ selective indifference to 
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is worth pausing to consider the reasons for 
their selective cognizance.  As mentioned above, there are indeed Four-
teenth Amendment-related areas—namely the original understanding of the 
effect of the Equal Protection Clause on segregated public institutions and 
the legitimacy of incorporation itself—in which originalists (as much as 
others) have long been deeply engaged in historical and doctrinal debate.65  
Might it be then, that their relative inattention to other ways in which the 
Fourteenth Amendment might influence modern interpretation is simply an 
oversight, to be expected in a methodology that until recently was not ad-
vanced with the analytic sophistication many of its modern proponents 
claim?  Might it be that I have indeed identified little more than a “Gotcha!” 
to be corrected when Originalism 3.0 hits the law reviews? 
It will be profitable to reconsider this objection once we have exam-
ined more rigorously the potential reasons for originalists’ selective neglect.  
For now, consider that the two areas in which originalists have most aggres-
sively engaged the Fourteenth Amendment are areas in which nonengage-
ment poses an existential threat to originalism.  The most well-known 
originalist inquiries into the original understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause with respect to school segregation are in service of the view that 
originalism is not inconsistent with Brown and therefore irrelevant.  
Originalist resuscitations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are neces-
sary in order to prevent originalism from condemning all applications of the 
Bill of Rights to the states.  Anyone who argues that the Bill of Rights 
should not apply to actions by state and local officials has thereby left the 
 
 61. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 839 (2011) (characterizing Skousen’s books as “[t]he most popular sources 
about the Founders and the Constitution among Tea Party supporters”). 
 62. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP 85 (rev. ed. 2009). 
 63. Id. at 81. 
 64. Id. at 83. 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 12–18. 
GreeneFinalAuthorReview 5/24/2012  9:25 PM 
116 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:nnn 
mainstream conversation about rights.  Continuing to refer to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s history in these contexts is, I will argue, entirely consistent 
with the view that originalism owes both its legal and its broader cultural 
prominence less to any devotion to a consistent or even persuasive set of 
interpretive rules than to its role in advancing an influential normative ar-
gument about American identity. 
II.   
As Part I demonstrates, the curious gap between originalism in theory 
and originalism in practice regarding the role of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is not solely a feature of popular commentary.  Were it so, one might easily 
dismiss the divergence as deriving from a lack of sophistication about con-
stitutional theory.  Just as participants in popular discourse continue to 
characterize originalism in terms of Framers’ intent66 even as many aca-
demics have shifted to original meaning,67 we might suppose that misun-
derstanding the mechanics of incorporation or the original imperatives of 
the Equal Protection Clause results from little more than an unwillingness 
or an inability to understand what it means to practice the theory of 
originalism.  We might assume, in other words, that the practice is coarse 
even as (and perhaps in part because) the theory is rich and complex.  But 
when many of the most thoughtful and influential practitioners and explica-
tors of a theory appear to be getting the theory wrong in practice, we must 
consider the possibility that the theory is less interesting than the practice, 
or rather that the theory of interest is simply not what its practitioners say it 
is.  Maybe, in other words, Levin has it about right.68 
This Part suggests reasons why originalists systematically undervalue 
the Fourteenth Amendment. These reasons are not derived from any extant 
theory of originalist interpretation; as I have argued, originalism in theory 
does not permit this undervaluation.  Nor are these reasons derived wholly 
from cultural profiling, even as they draw from research that fits within an-
thropological methods.69  Rather, the reasons emerge in large measure from 
an assessment of the work constitutional history actually does in constitu-
tional argument.  This is lawyers’ business, inasmuch as lawyers, in exca-
vating and describing the architecture of legal analysis, are anthropologists 
within their domain. 
 
 66. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
 67. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248–
49 (2009) (describing the shift among originalists from focusing on original intent to deciphering 
original meaning). 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60. 
 69. See Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 10, at 408–10. 
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Any competent taxonomist of constitutional argument must include 
history among the resources to be deployed, and indeed the most influential 
taxonomists—Philip Bobbitt and Richard Fallon—appear to give historical 
arguments a prominent place in their accounts.70  But we must be careful to 
distinguish, as historians are so often eager, how historians and constitu-
tional lawyers use history.  “[H]istorians[,]” Jack Rakove writes, “have little 
stake in ascertaining the original meaning of a clause for its own sake, or in 
attempting to freeze or distill its true, unadulterated meaning at some pris-
tine moment of constitutional understanding.”71  By contrast, originalists 
are interested in using history as a form of normative democratic authority, 
and so the search for a single, identifiable original meaning of or intention 
behind a constitutional provision has high stakes indeed; the stakes in-
crease, moreover, in proportion to the quality or narrative purchase (within 
the legal community) of the authority invoked.  While, as Rakove writes, 
historians may “rest content with—even revel in—the ambiguities of the 
evidentiary record,”72 ambiguity is a potentially fatal threat to the original-
ist’s enterprise.  It would be odd, given these constraints, if originalists re-
garded all equally accessible sources of meaning as equally useful to their 
analysis.  We should instead, and appropriately, expect a vigorous contest 
over the meaning of particular high-reward forms of authority and relative 
indifference to low-reward (even if, at times, less ambiguous) forms of au-
thority.  
We should expect such a contest even among those legal academics 
who are fluent in historical methods (just as we should expect it among 
those bona fide historians who are attuned to the consequences of their 
work for resolution of political and legal debate).73  So long as the enter-
prise aims to endow a set of historical materials with normative authority, it 
necessarily must negotiate among the disparate demands of accuracy and 
ethos.  A careful scholar must document the complexity of the historical 
record, but a legal advocate must emphasize sources of authority with pur-
chase within the community of constitutional lawyers.  He cannot be all sa-
 
 70. Bobbitt discusses historical argument first in both of his books on constitutional interpre-
tation, although he resists any explicit hierarchy.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: 
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
12–13 (1991).  Historical argument sits second (following text) in Fallon’s five-tiered hierarchy of 
constitutional argument.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1243–46 (1987) (placing historical intent argu-
ments above arguments based on theory, precedent, and value). 
 71. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 9 (1997). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 169 (1998) (cau-
tioning not to maintain a fastidious segregation between “lawyers’ legal history” and “historians’ 
legal history”). 
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bermetrician; he must win games and sell tickets.  For a judge, who is un-
likely to be an able historian and whose peer group does not demand the 
competence norms of professional academics, we should expect conclu-
sions as to original meaning to be even more heavily leveraged by the need 
for certainty and the burdens of ethical argument.74  As Robert Cover said, 
“We view the acts of history as authoritative precisely because we read into 
that history that part of the past which we choose to make authoritative, 
which we wish to emulate.”75  To this the historian Laura Kalman replies, 
“I doubt any historian considers the past authoritative.”76 
The features of history that endow it with authority in constitutional 
argument cannot be adduced through historical methods and need not align 
with historians’ assessments of value.77  The statement that the Establish-
ment Clause means X because Madison had X in mind when he wrote his 
Memorial and Remonstrance derives from an account of authority, not of 
history.  And the reasons why Madison’s actions and beliefs wield authority 
within arguments about the meaning of the religion clauses need not relate 
to Madison’s particular relationship to the First Amendment.78  Madison’s 
identity as a principal drafter of other constitutional provisions, his co-
authorship of the Federalist Papers, his service to the country as its fourth 
President and as Commander in Chief during the War of 1812, and his role 
in contesting the Alien and Sedition Acts all contribute to the argument that 
we should permit his legacy to direct modern interpretation.  And yet, none 
of those aspects of Madison’s biography are relevant to assessing the con-
temporaneous meaning of the Memorial and Remonstrance or even Madi-
son’s intentions in drafting the Establishment Clause.  
For history to count as authoritative it must be prescriptive and it must 
be culturally resonant, but it need not, in effect, count as history.  It must be 
prescriptive because it has a resolutive function that has little to no use for 
ambiguity.  It must be culturally resonant because it is offered as a way out 
of the countermajoritarian difficulty: it is a means by which we locate our 
constitutive commitments in the past, and situate judges as faithful agents 
of those commitments.  It need not count as history because, as discussed 
 
 74. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1987). 
 75. Tanina Rostain, Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1713, 1715 (1987). 
 76. KALMAN, supra note 73, at 180. 
 77. See Powell, supra note 74, at 662–64 (arguing that “[h]istory itself will not prove any-
thing nonhistorical,” including whether the originalist approach is appropriate to constitutional 
practice).  
 78. Indeed, the most obvious means by which one might leverage that relationship into a 
claim of authority—by noting that Madison drafted the Establishment Clause—is a means ex-
pressly disclaimed by many academic originalists.  See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the 
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 720–21 (2011) (explaining the shift among many originalists 
from original intent theories to original meaning theories). 
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above, the art of legal persuasion aligns imperfectly with the professional 
narration of history.   
Understanding the function of history in constitutional argument ena-
bles us to make better sense of originalists’ systematic neglect of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  The basic contention is that, on the criteria just men-
tioned, Reconstruction is less usable, less mobilizable than the Founding 
Era for three broad reasons.  First, much of Reconstruction was a failure in 
its time.79  Second, the Fourteenth Amendment does not easily embody set-
tled and unambiguous constitutional propositions.80  Third, the Fourteenth 
Amendment occupies an awkward and contested space within our national 
memory.81 
A.  Failure 
If antagonists and partisans of the Reconstruction South can agree on 
anything, it is that Reconstruction was a failure.  For decades scholars have 
debated the reasons for that failure, with the so-called Dunning School pin-
ning it on the supposed incapacity of blacks to integrate into civil society,82 
and dissenters and later revisionists more inclined to blame southern recal-
citrance in the form of the Compromise of 1877 and the Jim Crow era that 
followed.83  No one could dispute, however, that the civil and political 
equality the Reconstruction Amendments sought to guarantee to free blacks 
would not come for another century or longer.  At the centennial of the 
Emancipation Proclamation in 1963, a black person in much of the South 
could not vote and was restricted in her choice of hotel, restaurant, water 
fountain, bathroom, theater seat, and marriage partner.  Blacks remained, 
officially and literally, “regarded as beings of an inferior order, and alto-
gether unfit to associate with the white race.”84 
The failure of Reconstruction generally, and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in particular, poses significant obstacles to the use of that 
Amendment’s original understanding as authority in modern cases.  I focus 
here on two in particular.  First, the Fourteenth Amendment does not figure 
prominently in narratives of constitutional restoration.  Second, Reconstruc-
tion’s heroes sit outside the American pantheon.  
 
 79. See infra Part II.A. 
 80. See infra Part II.B. 
 81. See infra Part II.C. 
 82. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, 
at xviii (2002) (writing that Dunning School scholars pushed the idea that “childlike blacks . . . 
were unprepared for freedom and incapable of properly exercising the political rights Northerners 
had thrust upon them”). 
 83. See john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 L. & 
INEQ. 355, 376 (2007). 
 84. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
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Contests over ethos conform to several dichotomies, what Jack Balkin 
might call “nested oppositions,”85 evident within U.S. constitutional argu-
ment.  We debate whether our better nature is individualistic or communi-
tarian, assimilationist or pluralistic, anchored in the past or realized contin-
uously and prospectively into the future.  The last of these dichotomies, 
which we may recharacterize as an opposition between narratives of resto-
ration versus redemption, has long mapped onto the central divide between 
originalists and living constitutionalists.  Those who affiliate with original-
ism tend to emphasize restorative narratives; those who affiliate with living 
constitutionalism tend to emphasize redemptive narratives.86 
When we use history in constitutional argument, the sources we em-
phasize reinforce the orientation of the kind of narrative we wish to deploy.  
Because the Fourteenth Amendment did not immediately achieve its ends—
and in some ways has yet to do so—it is well-suited to redemptive narra-
tives and ill-suited to restorative ones.  As Balkin writes, “Through consti-
tutional redemption, the Constitution becomes what it always promised it 
would be but never was; it changes in the direction of its correct interpreta-
tion and application; it responds appropriately to alterations in time and cir-
cumstance.”87  Fidelity to the broad principles of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is not and cannot comfortably be framed as fidelity to 
the world the Fourteenth Amendment actually created; all participants in 
modern constitutional argument agree that that world was deeply incon-
sistent with the Amendment’s promise.  Robert Cover writes that 
“[r]edemption takes place within an eschatological schema that postulates: 
(1) the unredeemed character of reality as we know it, (2) the fundamentally 
different reality that should take its place, and (3) the replacement of the 
one with the other.”88  The unfortunate reality of Reconstruction means that 
in order to be a Fourteenth Amendment originalist, one must be telling a re-
demptive narrative.  But the more one focuses on redemption, the less one 
believes in originalism. 
A second obstacle to Fourteenth Amendment originalism that arises 
out of the failure of its drafters is, quite simply, that its drafters were fail-
 
 85. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1990) (reviewing JOHN M. 
ELLIS, AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION (1989)) (defining nested oppositions as those “which also in-
volve a relation of dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed concepts”). 
 86. Indeed, controlling for demographic variables, issue positions, and other ideological vari-
ables, an individual’s relative level of moral traditionalism—her relative suspicion of “newer life-
styles” and embrace of tradition—is among the most robust predictors of her relative affinity for 
originalism.  Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 10, at 408–10. 
 87. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 6 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]. 
 88. Robert M. Cover, 1982 Term—Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 
(1983). 
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ures.  Consider the dissenting opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist in Wallace 
v. Jaffree, in which the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that required a 
moment of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer” in public schools.89  
The last piece of evidence Justice Rehnquist marshals in support of the 
view that the Establishment Clause was not originally understood to prohib-
it a legislature from encouraging prayer is the fact that “George Washington 
himself . . . proclaimed a day of ‘public thanksgiving and prayer, to be ob-
served by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of 
Almighty God.’”90  Justice Rehnquist added the following coda: “History 
must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority 
of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause.”91 
Justice Rehnquist’s invocation of Washington in this way is interesting 
for several reasons.  First, like many originalist opinions already mentioned, 
it uses eighteenth-century history to yield the “true meaning”92 of the Bill 
of Rights as applied to state practices—in this case endorsement of institu-
tional prayer—without acknowledging the potential relevance of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the substantive inquiry.  Whether or not Washington 
or the Wallace majority strayed from the original meaning of the Estab-
lishment Clause, at a minimum the Fourteenth Amendment strayed from 
that meaning, and yet it is treated as a technicality.93  Second, Washington 
is not invoked merely as an example of a reasonable contemporaneous 
reader of the Constitution.  His authority derives from, and is reinforced by, 
his status as “Father of his Country.”94 The honorific is particularly apt here 
because Washington is the Nation’s father in multiple ways: the prevailing 
general in its war for independence; the presiding officer at its constitution-
al convention; and its first President, responsible for countless decisions 
(including the decision to step down after two terms) that would set signifi-
cant and ultimately constitutive precedents.  Washington is the punctuation 
mark on Justice Rehnquist’s dissent because Washington is the Greatest 
American Hero.  Third, Justice Rehnquist contrasts Washington the hero 
 
 89. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 90. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 49 (majority opinion) (invoking the Fourteenth Amendment merely as a vehicle 
for incorporation). 
 94. It is a common nickname for Washington, and indeed has been used before in the Su-
preme Court.  Justice Frankfurter called Washington “the Father of his Country” in his concurring 
opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring), and United States v. Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 124 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).  The title has also been conferred on Cicero, Julius and Augustus Caesar, 
Andrea Do’rea, and Androni’cus Paleaol’ogus. E. COBHAM BREWER, BREWER’S DICTIONARY OF 
PHRASE & FABLE 411 (Ivor H. Evans ed., 14th ed. 1989).  
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with “a majority of the Court today.”95  The reference announces an affinity 
both with those who harbor an anti-elite bias and with those who are in-
clined to think it self-evident that Washington’s example must prevail over 
the views of “today.” 
It is impossible to imagine a judge using John Bingham in a similar 
way.  Bingham was a skilled orator, an outspoken abolitionist, a prosecutor 
of Lincoln’s assassins, and the most significant drafter of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but as a descriptive matter, he is not a national hero.  In Cadiz, 
Ohio, where Bingham spent most of his life, the main road out of town once 
bore Bingham’s name, but it is now called East Market Street.  The local 
elementary school used to be called Bingham Grammar School, but is now 
called Harrison Westgate Elementary School.  Efforts in recent years by the 
Harrison County (Ohio) Historical Society to have the U.S. Postal Service 
issue a commemorative stamp in Bingham’s honor have been unsuccessful.  
The Wikipedia page for Mercer, Pennsylvania, where Bingham was born, 
does not mention the father of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it notes that 
the town is the birthplace of “the 19th century painter Samuel Waugh, actor 
and impresario J C  Williamson[, and] Trent Reznor, creator of the band 
Nine Inch Nails.”96  There are many reasons why Bingham is not memori-
alized,97 some of which I discuss elsewhere in this section, but one of those 
reasons is surely that his singular accomplishment was a failure in his life-
time. 
B.  Determinacy 
The chief aim of much originalist constitutional interpretation is set-
tlement.  H. Jefferson Powell writes that “[o]riginalism’s attractiveness, for 
 
 95. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 96. Mercer, Pennsylvania, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercer,_Pennsylvania 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
 97. Bingham was demonized in the Fourteenth Amendment account of Charles Fairman, 
whose conclusion that incorporation was not intended had to confront Bingham’s explicit state-
ments to the contrary.  See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill 
of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 135–37 (1949) (contextualizing Bingham’s statements regarding 
incorporation and arguing that the debates reflect a different understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  Pamela Brandwein writes that the “conceptual apparatus” that shaped the debate 
between Fairman and William Crosskey “linked the production of institutionally ‘credible’ repre-
sentations of Fourteenth Amendment history to political distributions that were harmful to 
blacks.”  PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 97 (1999).  Educated in the 
heyday of the Dunning School, Fairman called the Joint Committee on Reconstruction a “conspir-
acy,” and portrayed Bingham as unsophisticated and “confused” by Chief Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).  Id. at 115–16.  Fairman was also a Har-
vard Law School professor during Justice Scalia’s matriculation. Without veering too far toward 
psychoanalysis, it seems reasonable to suppose that anyone persuaded to take a dim view of in-
corporation and of Bingham would be unlikely, in later life, to take incorporation seriously even 
after grudging acceptance. 
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the most part, lies in the possibility it seems to offer the judicial interpreter 
of an escape from personal responsibility;”98 it is a delegation, that is, to a 
source of authority that is sufficiently objective to enable consensus around 
the answers to difficult constitutional questions.  The “great appeal” of 
originalism, Michael McConnell writes, is that it draws on “the foundation-
al principles of the American Republic—principles we can all perceive for 
ourselves and that have shaped our Nation’s political character—and not the 
political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial of-
fice.”99  It is not that originalism must necessarily employ transparent—and 
thereby debate-stifling—criteria of adjudication, but, as Powell and 
McConnell imply, disaggregating modern interpretation from modern 
thinking would be considerably less attractive without this feature.100 
The Fourteenth Amendment tends away from settlement.  This is per-
haps a partial restatement of the earlier claim that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment better enables redemptive than restorative constitutional narratives, 
but the open-ended nature of Fourteenth Amendment interpretation in no 
way depends on its historical failures.  The Amendment represents a com-
mitment to a series of principles rather than rules or even standards, and 
principles often do not lend themselves to definitive application.  Balkin, 
defending the notion that living constitutionalism is not inconsistent with 
constitutional fidelity, writes: 
The words “equal protection of the laws” mean pretty much the 
same as they did in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted.  However, the best way to apply these words today may 
be very different from the way that the generation that adopted 
this text would have expected or even desired.101 
Ronald Dworkin has long made a similar point, that the clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “must be understood in the way their language 
most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and incorpo-
rate these by reference, as limits on government’s power.”102  And, 
Dworkin continues, “Very different, even contrary, conceptions of a consti-
tutional principle . . . will often fit language, precedent, and practice[,] . . .  
and thoughtful judges must then decide on their own which conception does 
most credit to the nation.”103  The problem is that original understanding is 
 
 98. Powell, supra note 74, at 659–60. 
 99. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convic-
tions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, 
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)). 
 100. See Colby, supra note 78, at 714–15. 
 101. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 87, at 231. 
 102. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996). 
 103. Id. at 11. 
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ineffective as constitutional authority approximately to the degree that its 
yield may fairly be described as incommensurable visions of the good.104  
Originalists seek answers from the “Father of his Nation,” not from 
thoughtful judges. 
Originalism is most persuasive when it is, to borrow from Cover, “ju-
rispathic.”105  Cover worried that law may too easily be conceived narrowly 
as the search for the uniquely correct application of a norm.  Rather, the law 
always states a concept of which there are multiple competing conceptions, 
distributed across diverse normative communities.  If Balkin and Dworkin 
are correct, then the Fourteenth Amendment is fundamentally jurisgenera-
tive: fidelity to the Amendment precisely requires a judge to recognize the 
instability of legal norms over time and across communities.  This attribute 
endows the Fourteenth Amendment with a pluralistic character—the Na-
tion’s marginalized persons may hold out hope of redeeming its offers of 
citizenship, of equality, of due process, without contesting the legitimacy of 
prevailing doctrine and without sacrificing fidelity to the Constitution.  By 
contrast, originalism in its jurispathic form denies not just the normative 
correctness but the very legitimacy of alternative readings of the text.  Its 
aim is to assimilate competing normative visions into a single descriptive 
reality.  To apply effectively to the Fourteenth Amendment, this form of 
originalism must deny the Amendment’s basic character. 
C.  Memory 
The Iraqi scholar Kanan Makiya has observed that “[r]emembering is a 
choice we make . . . , a political act.”106  The cultural and historical treat-
ment of Bingham is perhaps a testament to the truth of the observation.  The 
contours of American memories of the Civil War and of Reconstruction 
have long been shaped both by the need of southerners at least to justify and 
at best to glorify the actions of their forebears and the need of both North 
and South to reconstitute themselves as a united state.  In telling the story of 
 
 104. In recent work, originalists John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport resist this claim, argu-
ing that it rests on a “fallacy” that conflates abstract language with abstract meaning.  See John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 2), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959668.  McGinnis and 
Rappaport observe, correctly, that a text may employ abstract language that would have been in-
terpreted contemporaneously as having a well-known meaning.  See id. at 7.  This possibility 
speaks to the viability of a merger between originalism and living constitutionalism, but it does 
nothing to diminish the observation that broad language is susceptible to competing and incompat-
ible applications even if its semantic meaning is well understood. 
 105. While jurisgenerative law arises from communities supplying legal meaning through dis-
tinctive cultural norms, jurispathic law “imposes a hierarchy” on diverse interpretations of the law.  
See Cover, supra note 88, at 40.  
 106. The Brian Lehrer Show: The Memory Industry (WNYC radio broadcast May 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.wnyc.org/people/kanan-makiya/. 
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the significance within the Nation’s collective memory of the war and its 
aftermath, David Blight reminds us that the twin ends of Reconstruction 
were fundamentally at odds: “Americans faced an overwhelming task after 
the Civil War and emancipation: how to understand the tangled relationship 
between two profound ideas—healing and justice.”107  Healing seemed to 
require acts and omissions of memory that justice did not permit. 
The blood was barely dry at Appomattox when the central themes of 
the Lost Cause movement began to take hold in the South.  In its first post-
bellum editorial after reopening in December 1865, the Richmond Dispatch 
maintained that the war was fought over states’ rights; that Confederate sol-
diers had fought with “courage and constancy;” and that the Grays’ fate was 
sealed by “superior numbers and resources.”108  The editorial did not men-
tion slavery or emancipation.109  Deep into the last century, the Lost Cause 
movement told the dominant story of the Civil War in the South: slavery 
was not the cause of the war; most slaves had a benevolent relationship with 
their masters; Robert E. Lee was a gentlemanly, near saintly hero; and the 
failure of Reconstruction owed to corrupt northern “carpetbaggers” who 
imposed graft and subjugation, preventing the civil South from achieving 
reconciliation in its own way.
110
  
The United Confederate Veterans and the United Daughters of the 
Confederacy (“UDC”) formed history committees devoted to rebutting al-
leged biases of northern historians’ telling of the war and Reconstruc-
tion.111  The leaders of the UDC gave speeches, wrote editorials, and en-
dorsed southern-friendly schoolbooks (while condemning all others), 
leading Blight to conclude that “[o]n a popular level [the UDC] may have 
accomplished more than professional historians in laying down for decades 
(within families and schools) a conception of a victimized South, fighting 
nobly for high Constitutional principles, and defending a civilization of be-
nevolent white masters and contented African slaves.”112  UDC-approved 
histories emphasizing, among other things, that “Reconstruction was the vi-
cious oppression of an innocent South and the exploitation of ignorant 
blacks,” became the received common wisdom in the South, eventually 
promoted not just by explicitly partisan organizations but by state depart-
ments of education.113 
 
 107. DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 3 
(2001). 
 108. Id. at 37–38. 
 109. Id. at 38. 
 110. See Ken I. Kersch, Beyond Originalism: Conservative Declarationism and Constitutional 
Redemption, 71 MD. L. REV. 229, 260–67 (2011). 
 111. Id. at 277. 
 112. Id. at 278, 282. 
 113. Id. at 282–83. 
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The continuing influence of this intellectual history is reflected in re-
cent controversies over the commemoration of Confederate History Month.  
From 1995 to 1997, Virginia Governor George Allen issued a proclamation 
in connection with the commemoration in which he referred to the Civil 
War as “a four-year struggle for independence and sovereign rights;” to 
“the honorable sacrifices of [Virginia’s] leaders, soldiers and citizens to the 
cause of liberty[;]” and to the soldiers who were “overwhelmed by insur-
mountable numbers and resources of their determined opponents, . . . [who] 
returned to their homes and families to rebuild their communities in peace . 
. . .”114  The proclamation did not mention race or slavery, nor (needless to 
say) did it refer to Black Codes or the Ku Klux Klan, which was founded by 
Confederate veterans at the start of Reconstruction.  Allen’s successor, Jim 
Gilmore, responding to criticisms of Allen’s proclamation, issued a less 
hagiographic proclamation for a “Month for Remembrance of the Sacrifices 
and Honor of All Virginians Who Served in the Civil War,” in which slav-
ery was explicitly cited as a but-for cause of the war.115  In response, the 
Virginia chapter of the Sons of Confederate Veterans issued a competing 
proclamation defending Virginia’s participation in the war; referring to fed-
eral troops as “an invading army”; referring to Richmond as “the wartime 
home of our beloved President Jefferson Davis”; and rededicating itself to 
“teach[ing] the true history of the South to future generations.”116  Two 
successive Democratic administrations refused to issue any proclamations, 
but Republican Governor Bob McDonnell revived the practice in 2010, is-
suing a proclamation that, like Allen’s, made no mention of slavery.117 
The footprint of the Lost Cause version of the war and Reconstruction 
was not limited to the South.  Amid the cottage industry in Civil War reen-
actments and histories, it is easy to overlook the absence of similar recogni-
tion of Reconstruction.  Reconstruction entailed military occupation of the 
South, coerced political communion between former masters and former 
slaves, and the enactment, under duress, of a fundamental reordering of the 
Constitution.  Blight writes that “[d]uring Reconstruction, many Americans 
increasingly realized that remembering the war . . . became, with time, easi-
er than struggling over the enduring ideas for which [its] battles had been 
 
 114. Katherine D. Walker, United, Regardless, and a Bit Regretful: Confederate History 
Month, the Slavery Apology, and the Failure of Commemoration, 9 AM. NINETEENTH CENTURY 
HIST. 315, 315–16 (2008). 
 115. Id. at 323–24. 
 116. Id. at 326–27. 
 117. In response to the controversy, McDonnell later revised the proclamation to include a dis-
cussion of slavery.  He initially defended his omission by saying that he had “focused on the [is-
sues he] thought were most significant for Virginia.”  Anita Kumar & Rosalind S. Helderman, 
McDonnell Revives Storm Over Va.’s Confederate Past, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2010, at A1. 
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fought.”118  At a ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Battle of Gettysburg, President Woodrow Wilson, flanked by a U.S. flag to 
his right and a Confederate flag to his left, delivered the following address: 
How wholesome and healing the peace has been!  We have found 
one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no 
longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past, the quarrel 
forgotten—except that we shall not forget the splendid valor, the 
manly devotion of the men then arrayed against one another, now 
grasping hands and smiling into each other’s eyes.  How com-
plete the union has become and how dear to all of us, how un-
questioned, how benign and majestic, as state after state has been 
added to this, our great family of free men!119 
The demands of national reconciliation required, at the expense of justice, a 
retelling of Reconstruction that regarded its costly and failed effort to 
achieve substantive emancipation for millions of former slaves as an arro-
gant mistake. 
Through the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant narrative of 
Reconstruction was supplied by denizens of the Dunning School, after Wil-
liam Dunning, whose Reconstruction, Political and Economic 1865-1877 
tells a story of peace delayed by “radicals and carpet-baggers.”120  We get a 
glimpse of the tenor of Dunning School Reconstruction history in the writ-
ings of the influential historian and native Alabamian Walter Fleming.  On 
Fleming’s telling, the Black Codes in southern states and the federal gov-
ernment’s Freedmen’s Bureau represented two “proposed solutions” to “the 
same problem”121 of “guiding the freedmen into a place in the social or-
der,”122 and the Black Codes “might have succeeded if [they] had been giv-
en a fair trial.”123  The Bureau itself was largely populated by “men of infe-
rior ability and character, either blind partisans of the negro or corrupt and 
subject to purchase by the whites.”124  Fleming was deeply dismissive of 
the radical Republican leadership in Congress.  Thaddeus Stevens was 
“vindictive and unscrupulous;”125 Charles Sumner “unpractical, theoretical, 
and not troubled by constitutional scruples”;126 Senators Oliver P. Morton 
of Indiana and Benjamin Wade of Ohio “bluff, coarse, and ungenerous”; 
 
 118. BLIGHT, supra note 107, at 31. 
 119. Id. at 10–11. 
 120. WILLIAM A. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 1865–1877, at 
341 (1907). 
 121. WALTER LYNWOOD FLEMING, THE SEQUEL OF APPOMATTOX 89 (1919). 
 122. Id. at 115. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 99. 
 125. Id. at 122. 
 126. Id. at 123. 
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Senator George Boutwell of Massachusetts “fanatical and mediocre”; and  
Massachusetts Congressman Benjamin Butler “a charlatan and dema-
gogue.”127  The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which drafted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, made “[n]o serious effort . . . to ascertain the actual 
conditions in the South.”128  Due in large part to failures of character 
among Republicans, “[s]carcely a measure of Congress during reconstruc-
tion was designed or received in a conciliatory spirit.”129  
Fleming says that Reconstruction wreaked havoc on the South, espe-
cially in states with large black populations; these states felt the brunt of the 
failed policies because occupation meant their governments were controlled 
by “ignorant” and “corrupt” carpetbaggers and scalawags who retained 
power solely due to black enfranchisement and “could secure no support 
from the respectable elements of the electorate.”130  Conditions for emanci-
pated blacks in these and other southern states declined because “[t]he seri-
ous matter of looking out for himself and his family and of making a living 
dampened the negro’s cheerful spirits.”131  Ignorant, dispossessed, and vin-
dictive, many blacks were led to violence, Fleming writes, leading whites 
with little choice but to found Ku Klux Klan orders.  Fleming adds: 
The Ku Klux movement . . . grew out of a general conviction 
among the whites that the reconstruction policies were impossible 
and not to be endured. . . .  The people of the South were by law 
helpless to take steps towards setting up any kind of government 
in a land infested by a vicious element—Federal and Confederate 
deserters, bushwhackers, outlaws of every description, and ne-
groes, some of whom proved insolent and violent in their newly 
found freedom.132 
Fleming writes that the Klan was simply a “primitive method[] of jus-
tice,”133 motivated by “[t]he lawlessness of the negroes . . . and the disturb-
ing influences of the black troops, of some officials of the [Freedmen’s] Bu-
reau, and of some of the missionary teachers and preachers, [who] caused 
the whites to fear insurrections and to take measures for protection.”134  
 
 127. Id. at 125. 
 128. Id. at 126. 
 129. Id. at 280. 
 130. Id. at 220–21. 
 131. Id. at 274. 
 132. Id. at 243–44. 
 133. Id. at 264. 
 134. Id. at 48.  Woodrow Wilson offers a similar explanation for the rise of the Ku Klux Klan 
in V WOODROW WILSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 58 (1931) (“The white men of 
the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation to rid themselves, by fair means 
or foul, of the intolerable burdens of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant ne-
groes . . . . ”). 
GreeneFinalAuthorReview 5/24/2012  9:25 PM 
2012] FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM 129 
W.E.B. DuBois, who was hardly afraid to throw a punch, criticized Flem-
ing, but said that, in comparison to other prominent historians of Recon-
struction, his works “have a certain fairness and sense of historic hones-
ty.”135  
According to Eric Foner, the Dunning School retained its hold on “the 
popular imagination” until the 1960s.136  We see its fingerprints in simplis-
tic portrayals of blacks (in blackface) and the heroic cast of the Klan in The 
Birth of a Nation.137  We see its legacy in Margaret Mitchell’s depictions of 
blacks during Reconstruction as unbridled and apelike, and her description 
of the Klan as a “tragic necessity” in Gone With the Wind.138  We see it in 
the robes of the Statue of Liberty, which obscure the broken shackles 
around Lady Liberty’s feet, a tribute to black emancipation deliberately 
hidden from view so as not to offend southerners.139  As Blight writes:  
The memory of slavery, emancipation, and the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments never fit well into a developing narrative 
in which the Old and New South were romanticized and wel-
comed back to a new nationalism, and in which devotion alone 
made everyone right, and no one truly wrong, in the remembered 
Civil War.140 
The Fourteenth Amendment is a central player in a drama the Nation 
has chosen to forget.  This status cripples the Amendment’s capacity to do 
the work asked of originalist history.  Largely absent from or rendered in 
diminished form within the narratives we have long told about our national 
identity, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot derive authority from any status 
as a shared point of reference.  We do not regard its moment of creation as 
ethically unambiguous, and so it is disabled in resolving the ethical ambigu-
ity that is the stuff of hard cases.  Indeed, to the extent that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is viewed differently in the North and in the South, its expres-
sive tendency is to reinforce rather than resolve cultural division.141  In di-
agnosing the absence of originalist arguments in affirmative action cases, 
 
 135. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860–1880, at 720 (1935). 
 136. FONER, supra note 82, at xix–xx. 
 137. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (D.W. Griffith Corp. 1915). 
 138. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 914 (1936) (“Here was the astonishing 
spectacle of half a nation attempting, at the point of a bayonet, to force upon the other half the rule 
of negroes, many of them scarcely one generation out of the African jungles.”). 
 139. See Making the Case for the African-American Origins of the Statue of Liberty, 27 J. 
BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 65, 66 (2000) (noting that early models of the statue featured shackles 
on Lady Liberty’s left hand, which were later removed). 
 140. BLIGHT, supra note 107, at 4. 
 141. Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theo-
ry of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1320 (2003) (“[W]hat individuals accept as 
truth cannot be divorced from the values and practices that define their cultural identities.”). 
GreeneFinalAuthorReview 5/24/2012  9:25 PM 
130 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:nnn 
for example, we might note that originalists often oppose affirmative action 
as a policy matter, but a more complete story would recall that the Freed-
men’s Bureau—the prime exemplar of race-conscious governmental action 
during Reconstruction—was despised in the South.142  For southerners and 
for those educated within the Lost Cause tradition, the Bureau evokes ille-
gality.  Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment itself, forced down the throat 
of the southern political establishment, is neither a moment of pride nor of 
identity-formation for subsequent generations of white southerners.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment is unlikely to resonate with many such people, and 
they are unlikely to claim it, or even to recognize it, as ethical authority. 
III.   
There are many varieties of originalism in the legal academy, and not 
all treat the Fourteenth Amendment with disproportionate neglect.  The the-
oretical integrity reflected in some of those varieties is symptomatic, how-
ever, of the missing elements in their projects—the authoritarianism and 
narrative force that has enabled originalism to narrow the divide between 
professional and public constitutional discourse.  Self-described originalists 
who give appropriate regard to the redemptive potential of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are not wrong as to hermeneutics, and they are often persua-
sive as to the best understanding of Fourteenth Amendment principles.  
Where they fail, and where I fear they must fail, is in articulating a basis for 
Fourteenth Amendment authority that is capable of bridging the gap be-
tween originalists and nonoriginalists. 
It is fitting to begin with Balkin, as his provocative work inspires this 
Essay and the Symposium of which it is part.  Balkin has proposed what he 
calls “framework originalism,”143 under which modern interpreters are 
bound to the semantic meanings of the Constitution’s text and to the Consti-
tution’s choice of rules, standards, and principles, but are not bound by the 
original intentions or original expected applications of its drafters or ratifi-
ers.144  According to Balkin, framework originalism fully embraces both 
originalism and living constitutionalism because “[f]idelity to original se-
mantic meaning is consistent with a wide range of possible future constitu-
tional constructions that implement the original meaning and that add new 
institutional structures and political practices that do not conflict with it.”145  
Framework originalism “allows individuals in every generation to invoke 
the Constitution’s text and principles and call upon the American people to 
 
 142. FLEMING, supra note 121, at 89.  Mississippi Governor Benjamin Humphreys called the 
Freedmen’s Bureau “a hideous curse.”  Id. at 90. 
 143. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 87, at 228. 
 144. Id. at 228–29. 
 145. Id. at 231–32. 
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restore and redeem the Constitution.”146  For Balkin, originalism is in effect 
the practice of constitutional fidelity, and so rightly exercised, originalism 
serves both redemptive and restorative narratives. 
Balkin is dealing in semantics.  He implicitly concedes that most 
originalists are not framework originalists147 and he explicitly states that 
“[m]ost living constitutionalists are framework originalists, even if they do 
not realize it.”148  This is no less than an admission from Balkin that he is 
speaking Esperanto while the rest of us are speaking English.  That is not to 
say that Balkin does not offer valuable insights that undermine many of the 
basic theoretical assumptions of both originalists and living constitutional-
ists—perhaps we should all speak Esperanto—but it does mean that his 
message is likely to be lost in translation.  The dichotomy between living 
constitutionalists and originalists is a fact about the world that cannot be 
understood in isolation from other ways in which people divide themselves 
ideologically and culturally.  I do not take Balkin’s intervention necessarily 
to conflict with the point that the choice between living constitutionalism 
and originalism as it exists in the (English-speaking) world reflects diver-
gent understandings of American identity, and that constitutional method 
can serve as a language through which those understandings are coded into 
legal argument. 
Akhil Amar is only occasionally described as an originalist, and that is 
so in large measure because his work is not susceptible to the charges de-
scribed in this Essay.  Indeed, his most celebrated work, The Bill of Rights, 
is precisely a call for modern Americans to understand the ways in which 
the first ten amendments must be understood through the lens of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction.  The book is best known for its articulation of 
Amar’s theory of “refined incorporation,” under which the fact of incorpo-
ration is determined by the extent to which a right may be conceived in 
terms of the privileges or immunities of citizenship.149  It has been less ap-
preciated that the book also means to advocate that the meaning and scope 
of an incorporated right be understood with reference to the concerns that 
animated the Reconstruction generation.  Amar suggests, for example, that 
“the very meaning of freedom of speech, press, petition, and assembly was 
subtly redefined in the process of being incorporated,” so that the paradigm 
case shifted from people like John Peter Zenger to people like Harriet Bee-
cher Stowe (or, he might have said, Hinton Helper).150  
 
 146. Id. at 235. 
 147. Id. at 230–31. 
 148. Id. at 234. 
 149. AMAR, supra note 15, at 221. 
 150. Id. at 236. 
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Amar has gone further, though, to suggest that modern doctrine im-
plicitly recognizes the subtle transformative work performed by incorpora-
tion even as the rhetoric of such doctrine cites the eighteenth-century Fram-
ers.  Thus, the significance of the abolitionist cause to Reconstruction 
understandings of free speech argues for a greater role for federal judges 
relative to juries in protecting First Amendment rights, and modern doctrine 
has evolved in this direction.151  To the extent Amar is correct, his observa-
tions provide even greater support for the incongruity of originalist neglect 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For to the extent that he is correct, original-
ists interpreting incorporated rights not only work with a text crafted during 
Reconstruction but they often advance “originalist” claims that, in fact but 
not in rhetoric, are deeply affected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Amar is often described as a structuralist or a textualist rather than as 
an originalist, and Amar has not otherwise promoted himself.  It should be 
clear that this labeling impulse is itself a symptom of the problem this Essay 
identifies: those who take the Fourteenth Amendment seriously, and who 
(as a consequence) disclaim the kind of clause-bound interpretation de-
scribed in Part I, are not coded as actual originalists.  It is worthwhile, how-
ever, to consider two additional examples of conservative originalist schol-
ars who in recent years have engaged in inquiries that do not fit neatly into 
the patterns this Essay has described: Kurt Lash and Randy Barnett. Lash 
has devoted considerable attention to the drafting history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,152 and in a series of articles in the 1990s he sought expressly 
to demonstrate that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause 
were understood quite differently by the Fourteenth Amendment ratifying 
generation than by the eighteenth-century ratifiers.153  More recently, he 
has emphasized that when we discuss “incorporated” rights, “what we are 
after is not the incorporation of 1787 texts, but the public understanding of 
1868 texts—in particular the meaning of Privileges or Immunities and the 
scope of congressional power to enforce these newly constitutionalized 
rights.”154 
 
 151. Id. at 242.  Amar notes, for example, that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), relies on the (judge-empowering) Sedition Act as its paradigm negative precedent even as 
it announces a rule of decision—in a civil rights case, no less—that empowers judges rather than 
juries.  Id. at 243. 
 152. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John 
Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011); Kurt T. 
Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as 
an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010). 
 153. See Lash, Free Exercise, supra note 6; Lash, Establishment Clause, supra note 6.  Specif-
ically, according to Lash, the Reconstruction-era ratifiers believed that the Free Exercise Clause 
required accommodations from neutral laws of general applicability and that the Establishment 
Clause came to be viewed in individual rights terms, and not merely as a federalism provision. 
 154. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 6, at 449. 
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Barnett, who has been in the vanguard of so-called “new” originalists, 
has only recently begun to devote attention to Fourteenth Amendment in-
terpretation.  In an article published in 2011, Barnett canvassed abolitionist 
writings for evidence of the origins of Section 1 of the Amendment.155  He 
did so, however, not in the service of the view that many significant consti-
tutional rights casually grounded in the Founding must instead (or in addi-
tion) be viewed in light of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but rather to demonstrate that sophisticated antislavery constitutional 
arguments were advanced by nineteenth century abolitionists.156  Barnett’s 
recent work is therefore consistent with my earlier insinuation that original-
ist attention to the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of self-preservation: it 
aids the originalist cause to demonstrate that anti-Garrisonian arguments 
against a pro-slavery Constitution were well-grounded.157   
Still, Barnett’s shift in focus may be viewed more charitably as a 
recognition of his own previously stated view that “[d]iscerning and apply-
ing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a tricky busi-
ness.”158  His recent work may be but a preliminary and incremental step 
towards a bolder set of arguments.   
I do not doubt the sincerity of either Barnett or Lash (nor, indeed, of 
Justice Scalia), and it is possible that their work is in the vanguard of a 
“new, new originalism” that takes the Fourteenth Amendment much more 
seriously.  It is indeed in the interest of new originalists, many of whom 
have a libertarian bent, to revitalize the Fourteenth Amendment as a signifi-
cant site for anti-state arguments, particularly in the economic realm.159  If 
this Essay’s claims are correct, however, any scholar’s success at advancing 
a new version of originalism along these lines is likely thereby to render her 
framework less identifiably originalist.  The best either Lash or Balkin can 
expect is that current originalists will concede the label but find another 
more compelling means of self-identification that better resonates with their 
 
 155. Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 3 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 165 (2011). 
 156. Id. at 173–74.  
 157. See supra note 100. 
 158. Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMM. 405, 411 (2007). 
 159. Indeed, the fact that younger originalists tend to adopt a different posture toward the Four-
teenth Amendment might reflect important generational shifts in the politics of opposition that 
characterize originalism.  See Bobbitt, supra note 70, at 24 (arguing that historical arguments are 
often “better for dissent than for the Court”).  Older originalists, educated by Fairman and his con-
temporaries, accepted the New Deal settlement but rejected Warren Court liberalism, which is 
typified by a generous attitude towards incorporation.  By contrast, many modern originalists ac-
cept much of the Warren Court’s corpus but are comfortable revisiting the New Deal settlement, 
which tended to rein in the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisgenerative capacity.  I thank Jack Balkin 
for suggesting this point. 
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ethical values.160  Those whose interests tend toward the actual rather than 
merely the theoretical divides in constitutional argument will then, I predict, 
lose interest in writing about “originalism.” 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In one of the 2012 Republican presidential primary debates, the audi-
ence at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, 
cheered when questioner Brian Williams noted to Rick Perry that he had 
overseen 234 executions as Texas governor.161  The crowd reaction was 
much criticized, but it broadly reflects a cultural divide that exaggerates 
policy differences.  Even as strong majorities support both capital punish-
ment162 and high standards of review for capital cases, a hierarchical, law-
and-order orientation is, as Balkin would say, “nested in opposition”163 to 
an egalitarian, rights-focused orientation.  Cheering executions does not so 
much engage a policy debate as announce a cultural affinity. 
There may likewise be only marginal “policy” differences between the 
hermeneutic practices of originalism and living constitutionalism.  But 
originalism does much more than assist in textual analysis; it, too, announc-
es a cultural affinity.  Those sharing that affinity are suspicious rather than 
solicitous of Reconstruction and the work of the Reconstruction-era Repub-
licans.  For Justice Thomas’s opinion in Baze to have addressed that era ra-
ther than the Founding would have sacrificed a significant measure of au-
thority for his opinion.  It also would have denied him the chance to give 
that era’s approach to law and order a resounding cheer. 
 
 
 160. There is evidence that something like this has already happened.  Thomas Colby has ar-
gued that originalism has become intellectually respectable among academics only at the expense 
of the claims to judicial restraint that make it respectable among members of the public.  See gen-
erally Colby, supra note 78.  Divorcing original meaning from the original intent of the drafters, 
which is the major innovation of “new originalism,” made some theoretical and strategic sense but 
it made constitutional interpretation far more open-ended.  It also separated originalism from the 
authority of the individuals most directly responsible for the American Revolution and the original 
Constitution.  A quarter century after this innovation was announced by Justice Scalia, it remains 
rare for members of the public to substitute original meaning for original intent. 
 161. 2012 Republican Presidential Debate (NBC television broadcast Sept. 7, 2011). 
 162. Are You in Favor of the Death Penalty for a Person Convicted of Murder? 1936–2011 
Trend, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx. 
 163. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
